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ABSTRACT
This paper presents and experimentally evaluates two paralleliza-
tion strategies for the popular open-source Snort network intru-
sion detection system (NIDS). Snort identifies intrusion attempts
by processing a ruleset, a file which specifies various protocol-
based, string-based, and regular-expression-based signatures asso-
ciated with known attacks. As attacks proliferate, NIDS becomes
increasingly important. However, the computational requirements
of intrusion detection are great enough to limit average achiev-
able throughput to 557 Mbps on a commodity server-class PC —
just over half the link-level bandwidth. The strategies studied in
this paper accelerate the performance of Snort by parallelizing rule
processing while still maintaining the shared state information re-
quired for correct operation.
The conservative version proposed here parallelizes ruleset pro-
cessing at the level of TCP/IP flows, as any potential inter-packet
dependences are confined to a single flow. Any single flow is pro-
cessed in-order at one thread, but the flows are partitioned among
threads. This solution provides good performance for 3 of the 5
network packet traces studied, reaching as high as 3.0 speedup and
1.7 Gbps inspection rate when implemented on x86-64 Linux for
a server with two dual-core Opteron processors (four cores total).
Conservative parallelization allows an average inspection rate of
1.07 Gbps across all 5 traces – nearly twice the serial performance.
However, it is too restrictive to achieve good performance if there
are not enough concurrent flows in the traffic stream. To handle
this case, an optimistic version of Snort is also designed that ex-
ploits the observation that not all packets from a flow are actually
connected by dependence orders (although these dependences can-
not be discovered until deep in packet inspection). The optimistic
version thus allows a single flow to be simultaneously processed by
multiple threads, stalling processing only if an actual dependence is
found. The optimistic version has additional overheads that reduce
speedup by 7–13% for traces that have flow concurrency. How-
ever, the benefits of the optimistic appproach allow one additional
trace to see substantial speedup (2.2 on four cores). The average
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inspection rate stays nearly unchanged at 1.09 Gbps, but the peak
increases to over 2 Gbps. Consequently, this may be a good option
for protecting systems and networks with few flows.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet-based security attacks have proliferated in recent years,
with buffer overruns, cross-site scripting, and denial-of-service
among the most prominent and damaging forms of attack (com-
monly called exploits). A successful attacker can then initiate
follow-on exploits, such as compromising the local system to gain
administrator-level access or initiating denial of service attacks
against other machines. The most popular operating systems reg-
ularly publish security updates, but the combination of poorly-
administered machines, uninformed users, a vast number of tar-
gets, and ever-present software bugs has allowed exploits to remain
ahead of patches.
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDSes) run on a server
at the edge of a LAN to identify and log Internet-based attacks
against a local network. Unlike firewalls, which work by shutting
off external access to certain ports, NIDSes can monitor attacks on
externally-exposed ports used for running network services. The
most popular NIDS is the open-source Snort, which identifies in-
trusion attempts by comparing every inbound and outbound packet
against a ruleset [14]. Rules in the set represent characteristics of
known attacks, such as the protocol type, port number, packet size,
packet content (both strings and regular expressions), and the posi-
tion of the suspicious content. Each new type of attack leads to new
rules, with rulesets growing rapidly. The most recently-released
freely-available Snort rulesets have over 4000 rules.
The processing required by a network intrusion detection sys-
tem such as Snort is quite high, since the system must decode the
data, inspect the data according to the ruleset, and log intrusions.
These requirements limit Snort to an average packet processing rate
of about 557 Mbps on a modern host machine (2.2 GHz Opteron
processor) — just over half of the Gigabit link-level bandwidth.
Consequently, it is not possible to deploy Snort directly at a high-
end network access point that requires a data rate of 1 Gbps or
more. To address this problem, various companies and researchers
have proposed solutions based on clustering [8, 13, 15]. Clustered
NIDS potentially allows high scalability, but requires the use of an
expensive load-balancing switch.
This paper presents and evaluates methods to parallelize Snort
for PC-based systems with modern multiprocessor architectures.
Although an NIDS like Snort receives its input on a packet-by-
packet basis, an NIDS must seek to aggregate distinct packets into
TCP streams to prevent an attacker from disguising malicious com-
munications by breaking the data up across several packets. Addi-
tionally, an NIDS must process later packets in a given commu-
nication based on decisions made when analyzing earlier packets.
For example, if a given sequence of characters represents a pos-
sible attack in the body of an HTML document but may appear
normally in an image, the NIDS should not trigger an alert on that
attack if an earlier packet indicated that this data transfer was an
image. Such constraints are incorporated into Snort as stream re-
assembly and flowbits, respectively. All TCP data is reassembled
into streams, and about 36% of rules require flow tracking (90%
of which are related to NetBIOS). Although these phases require
packets to be processed in-order, a key observation is that any or-
dering or data sharing between the processing of separate pack-
ets only applies to packets in the same IP flow (which include not
only TCP streams but also source/destination communication pairs
in other protocols). Although this paper specifically targets the
Snort NIDS, the parallelization challenges and strategies discussed
here apply to any intrusion detection system that uses TCP stream
reassembly to merge packets together for inspection or preserves
other state across different packets from the same flow.
The parallelization strategies studied in this paper take differ-
ent approaches to splitting the Snort NIDS into threads: one con-
servative and one optimistic. The conservative scheme, called the
flow-concurrent parallelization, exploits concurrency by paralleliz-
ing ruleset processing on a flow-by-flow basis. All packets are ini-
tially received by one thread. That thread inspects the IP headers
to determine the flow to which the packet belongs and then steers
that packet to the appropriate processing thread based on whether
or not that flow has already been assigned to a thread. Since each
given flow is only processed by one thread at any given time, the
dependences required for proper stream reassembly and flow track-
ing are maintained easily. This scheme works well if there are
enough independent flows, but provides no benefits if all packets
are from the same flow. The latter case is not a likely situation in a
high-bandwidth edge NIDS, but does represent a limitation of this
scheme.
The alternative parallelization is an optimistic variant on flow
concurrency. This scheme starts with the basic flow-concurrent
parallelization but then has the ability to dynamically reassign a
flow to a different thread even while earlier packets of the flow are
still being processed, potentially exploiting parallelism even with
just one flow. This optimistic version relies on two key observa-
tions. First, TCP stream reassembly will still take place even if a
stream is broken at some arbitrary point; reassembly is triggered
by various flush conditions, one of which is a timeout. It is also
easy to force additional flushes if needed for correctness. Conse-
quently, any unprocessed earlier packets will still go through stream
reassembly at their thread even though later packets are being re-
assembled and processed in another thread. Second, most packets
do not match rules that use flowbits tracking, so enforcing order-
ing across all packets in a flow just to deal with a few problematic
rules is too restrictive. To precisely deal with the rules that do use
flowbits, the optimistic system stalls processing in any packet that
sets or checks flowbits unless it is the oldest packet in its flow. This
condition is checked by adding per-flow reorder buffers. This sys-
tem is optimistic in the sense that it reassigns threads under the
assumption that the actual use of flowbits is uncommon, but is still
conservative in maintaining correct ruleset processing without re-
quiring rollbacks and redundant processing.
Both parallelizations use most of the same packet processing
code as the current Snort (version 2.6), with minor modifications
to make certain code segments re-entrant and well-synchronized
using Pthreads. The resulting NIDS tools are evaluated on a 1U
rack-mounted x86-64 Linux system with two dual-core Opteron
processors (four processor cores in total). The conservative par-
allelization achieves substantial speedups on 3 of the 5 network
packet traces studied, ranging as high as 3.0 speedup on 4 pro-
cessor cores and processing at speeds up to 1.7 Gbps. The extra
overheads in the optimistic parallelization degrade performance by
about 10% for the traces that exhibit flow concurrency, limiting
speedup to 2.8 on four cores. However, the potential for intra-flow
parallelism enabled by the optimistic approach allows one addi-
tional trace to see good speedup (2.2 on four cores), with a peak
traffic rate over 2 Gbps. Both schemes see an average traffic rate of
just over 1 Gbps for the 5 traces, nearly doubling the performance
of the serial version with only a slight increase in hardware cost
and no increase in space. Either parallelization allows the benefits
of high-performance intrusion-detection without relying either on
higher clock frequencies (which are reaching a stage of diminishing
returns) or costly and space-consuming load balancers.
2. BACKGROUND
Snort is the most popular intrusion-detection system available.
The system and its intrusion-detection ruleset are freely available,
and both are regularly updated to account for the latest threats [14].
Snort rules detect attacks based on traffic characteristics such as
the protocol type (TCP, UDP, ICMP, or general IP), the port num-
ber, the size of the packets, the packet contents, and the position
of the suspicious content. Packet contents can be examined for
exact string matches and regular-expression matches. Snort can
perform thousands of exact string matches in parallel using one
of several multi-string pattern matching algorithms, including the
well-known Aho-Corasick algorithm [1] and a modified version of
the Wu-Manber algorithm [21], which can be selected by the user.
Additionally, Snort includes preprocessors that perform certain op-
erations on the data stream. Some important preprocessors include
flow, stream4, and HTTP Inspect. The flow preprocessor asso-
ciates each scanned packet to a specific network traffic flow be-
tween a source and destination pair and allows rules to set, clear
and check flags (called flowbits) associated with the flow based on
packet contents. For example, one rule checks for a GIF image
header and sets a specific flowbit, and another checks for a heap
overflow exploit that may occur in a later packet in flows which
have that bit set. The stream4 preprocessor tracks TCP connec-
tion states and allows rules to take them into consideration for rule
matches (for example, only match the rule if the packet is part of
an established TCP connection). Stream4 also performs stream re-
assembly, taking multiple scanned packets from a given direction
of a stream and builds a single conceptual packet by concatenating
their payloads, allowing rules to match packet content that spans
packet boundaries. This is one of the most important preprocessors
because without it, an attacker can trivially hide attacks by simply
splitting them across more than one packet. Packets are reassem-
bled into stream buffers and sent into the inspection process after
a “flush point” is reached. Flush points are triggered by conditions
such as processing a certain randomly-selected amount of data or a
timeout. The HTTP Inspect preprocessor converts URLs to a nor-
malized canonical form so that rules can specifically match URLs
rather than merely strings or regular expressions.
The Snort ruleset has been regularly updated over the past 5
years, quadrupling in size from approximately 1000 rules in 2001 to
over 4000 in March of 2006, and indicating a roughly constant rate
of increase of new attack signatures over that period of time. Al-
though the performance of the multi-string content matching does
not depend directly on the number of rules, a greater number of
rules does require a greater amount of memory and may require
more time to be spent in the stages of intrusion detection other than











Figure 1: The Snort packet processing loop
ploits (including over 30% for HTTP rules), with UDP at about
9%, ICMP at 4%, and other IP rules at just over 1%. Nearly all
of the higher-level protocol rules (HTTP, TCP, and UDP) check for
string matching content, but a large fraction of the ICMP and gen-
eral IP rules do not. Most rules specify several conditions on packet
content, and all of them must be met for a match to occur. The ex-
act string match (implemented by the multi-pattern matching algo-
rithm) is used as a first-order filter; tests for a specific rule are not
performed unless its corresponding pattern is matched first. This is
particularly important for rules that specify time-consuming regu-
lar expressions. About 10% of HTTP rules, 40% of all TCP rules,
and 30% of UDP rules test for regular expression matches.
The following rules demonstrate some of the kinds of traffic
characteristics used by Snort to detect attacks:
• SMTP Content-Type buffer overflow: TCP traffic to SMTP
server set, established connection to port 25, string “Content-
Type:”, regular expression “Content-Type:[ˆ\r\n]300,” (i.e.,
300 or more characters after the colon besides carriage return
or newline)
• PHP Wiki Cross-site Scripting: TCP traffic to HTTP server
set, established connection to HTTP port set, URI contains
string “/modules.php?”, URI contains string “name=Wiki”,
URI contains string “<script”
• DDOS Trin00 Attacker to Master: TCP traffic to home
network, established connection to port 27665, string
“betaalmostdone”
Figure 1 depicts the packet processing loop used by Snort. Snort
first reads a packet from the operating system using the pcap li-
brary (also used by tcpdump and other analysis tools). The de-
code stage interprets the packet’s tightly-encoded protocol headers
and associated information, storing the results in Snort’s loosely-
encoded packet data structure. Snort then invokes the preprocessors
that use and manipulate packet data in various ways. The rule-tree
lookup and pattern matching stage determines which rules are rel-
evant for the packet at hand (based on port number) and checks the
packet content for the attack signatures defined in the string rules
using the multi-string matching algorithms. Packets may match
one or more strings in the multi-string match stage, each of which
is associated with a different rule. For each of those rules, all
the remaining conditions are checked, including other strings, non-
content conditions, and regular expressions. Because each match
from the multi-pattern algorithm may or may not result in a match
for its rule as a whole, this stage may be thought of as a “verifica-
tion” stage. This stage also calls detection functions for any rules
without exact string matches. The last stage notifies the system
owner through alerts related to the specific rule matches.
Figure 2 categorizes the execution time of a system running
Snort into various components for five different network test pat-
terns. Most of these components correspond to the stages shown
in Figure 1. The component labeled Other includes utility code
and library functions shared among several components, the over-
all packet processing loop and other code between the stages, op-
erating system activity, and other processes running on the system
(such as the profiler itself). Most of the time spent in this category
consists of shared library calls (malloc, memset, etc.) and code
that calls the other stages and transitions between them. The re-
maining part is very small, and its effect it not considered further.
The Snort code tested here is modified to read all of its packets
sequentially from an in-memory buffer to allow the playback of a
large network trace representing communication from various hosts
to a local network. The network traces used in these tests and their
significance are described in more detail in Section 4.
The profiles shown here were gathered using the oprofile
full-system profiling utility running on a Sun Fire X4100 with two
dual-core Opterons (4 processors total), but Snort only runs on 1
processor. The system has 4 GB of DRAM and uses Linux ver-
sion 2.6.16. The profile was gathered using the oprofile full-
system profiling utility, and the Snort configuration included the
most important preprocessors: flow, stream4, and HTTP Inspect as
described above. The overall performance of this system averages
557 Mbps for these traces with a peak of 951 Mbps.
As Figure 2 shows, string content matching is a very important
component of intrusion detection, ranging from 20–70% of the ex-
ecution time of the system with an average of 38%. For all traces
except DEF1, the combination of ruleset processing components
(string match, verification, and regular expression) make up over
56% of execution time. Thus, any performance optimization strat-
egy must effectively target those components. At the same time, the
other components cannot be ignored since they make up an average
of 43% of execution time.
3. PARALLELIZATION ALTERNATIVES
Parallelizing any application requires first identifying the avail-
able concurrency. As discussed in Section 2, the main loop of the
Snort NIDS works on one packet at a time. Consequently, packet-
level concurrency seems a natural granularity for parallelizing this
application. However, several problems need to be addressed for
parallelism to be feasible.
3.1 Packet-level Parallelization
Figure 3 illustrates the interactions between the processing of
two separate packets in the Snort NIDS, following the basic Snort
processing loop depicted in Figure 1. The center column of Fig-
ure 3 depicts resources shared by the processing of multiple pack-
ets, with dashed lines indicating the accesses to these resources by
specific stages in the Snort processing loop. Although this paper
focuses on Snort, the same basic steps and resources are present in
any intrusion detection system that reassembles packets from the
same stream and tracks flow-specific state.
Figure 2: Execution time of Snort categorized into principal components when run using various traces on an Opteron-based system
For packet-level parallelization to be practical, no resource
should actually share common information across separate packets.
However, the data structures used by the flow and stream reassem-
bly preprocessors must be shared by different packets. In particu-
lar, the flow tracking table must be consulted while processing all
packets and must be updated any time a packet arrives from a flow
that is not currently being tracked. The flowbits are tested and set
in the verification stage. Similarly, each TCP packet’s stream must
have its state checked and set (loosely following TCP’s state tran-
sition table [7], but with provisions for handling missing packets
and picking up streams in mid-session) in the stream reassembly
preprocessor to decide if it even needs assembly — streams that
have not yet completed connection establishment should only be
processed packet-by-packet. The reassembly list must be searched
and updated on each packet, and the TCP stream state must again
be checked in verification to decide if a rule applies. Process-
ing packets completely independently could allow packets to ar-
rive out-of-order at stream reassembly, disrupting the tracking of
TCP connection states and possibly causing the system to miss an
attack. However, maintaining proper ordering on shared data struc-
tures would require multiple expensive synchronization operations
on every packet.
The notification stage must also share a common notification in-
terface whenever an alert actually arises. However, the specific or-
dering of alert reports is not important, so simple mutual exclusion
will suffice to enable the parallelization.
Other minor changes are also required for parallelization. For
example, stages such as multi-pattern matching currently assume
only one packet at a time and thus keep only one common structure
for all processing; these structures must now be associated with a
specific thread or packet to make the code reentrant.
3.2 Flow-level Parallelization
Although packet-level parallelization is impractical because of
ordering requirements on shared data structures, any actual infor-
mation sharing only applies to packets in the same flow. Since
packets from one flow will never affect the flowbits or TCP con-
nection state of another flow, different flows can be processed by



























Figure 3: Multiple instances of the Snort packet processing
loop, with access to shared resources explicitly identified
Moreover, the data sharing requirement of the stream preproces-
sor can be eliminated by simply maintaining separate stream tables
for each thread. Then each thread can be responsible for different
flows, as long as packets from the same flow are always steered to
the same processing thread in-order. This steering process should
consist of a minimal amount of code to determine the flow asso-
ciated with any given packet and then enqueue the packet for pro-
cessing by the appropriate thread.
In-order processing by each thread guarantees that the packets
from each flow will be processed in the same relative sequence
as in the serial code. Consequently, this flow-based concurrency
model maintains all dependence constraints between packets in a
flow. Note that this is actually conservative because a dependence
might not actually exist between successive packets in a flow. For
example, if the stream reassembly process encounters a flush point
between those packets, they will actually be reassembled into sepa-
rate stream buffers. Similarly, if a packet only matches rules that do
not use flowbits, it is irrelevant whether earlier packets have set any
flowbits. However, these conditions cannot be detected until the
system is already deep into packet inspection. Consequently, this
parallelization chooses to err on the side of caution by enforcing an
ordering between packets in the same flow.
Note that the effectiveness of flow-level parallelization depends
on the existence of multiple concurrent flows in the network stream.
If there is only one flow on the network, then it can only be in-
spected by one thread. However, because NIDS sensors usually
protect many machines or an entire network, it seems reasonable to
assume that many flows will be present at a time, particularly if a
large amount of bandwidth is being consumed.
Figure 4 shows the stages of the flow-based concurrency model.
This model consists of two components: the producer routine and
the consumer routine. The producer reads the packet from the in-
terface and assigns the packet to its thread based on its flow. The
consumer routine processes the remaining stages of the NIDS just
as in the single-threaded Snort. Each thread has its own work queue
and consumes packets from it as long as there are packets waiting.
If its own queue becomes empty, it then becomes the producer, and
begins reading packets and assigning them to their proper work
queues. These work queues can be quite large since each entry only
includes 3 pointers; consequently, it is unlikely that a work queue
will fill up and cause head-of-line blocking by stalling the producer.
Any thread can be the producer, but the producer code is protected
by a mutex lock so that only one thread may do so at a time. A
thread will continue to act as the producer until its own queue size
reaches a threshold, at which point it gives up the producer lock and
returns to processing from its work queue. The threshold prevents
the producer lock and shared data structures from passing back and
forth between processors (which causes expensive cache-to-cache
transfers) too often. If a second thread’s work queue empties and
it tries to become the producer simultaneously, it must waste time
waiting with nothing to do. To reduce the likelihood of such wasted
time, the producer routine uses a lower threshold to start consuming
its own data if another thread also has no work queue items. This
minor modification reduces the amount of time that the other thread
must spend waiting to either receive tasks or become the producer.
Completing the process of flow-level parallelization requires a
policy for assigning packet flows to threads. At a minimum, the
system must never allow packets from the same flow to be queued
or processed at multiple consumer threads at the same time. The
stream reassembly preprocessor (stream4) separates TCP sessions
based on their IP addresses and TCP ports, and the flow preproces-
sor considers IP addresses, layer 4 protocol, and ports if applicable,















































Figure 4: Flow-level parallelization strategy for Snort
ments will also satisfy stream4’s. The thread assignment scheme
must aim to avoid load imbalance. Static hashes based on IP ad-
dresses are fast and simple, but are prone to uneven assignments
if the flow distribution on the network is unfavorable. A better
approach is to dynamically assign flows to threads, based on infor-
mation available at runtime.
When a new flow arrives at the system, it is assigned to the thread
with the shortest work queue and this assignment is entered into a
table. The producer routine must steer later packets from the same
flow to the appropriate thread. The producer must determine the
packet’s flow information, consult a hash table to determine if the
flow has an existing assignment, or create an assignment otherwise.
Conveniently, these are exactly the actions taken by the flow pre-
processor to allow its tracking of flowbits. So, the flow preproces-
sor is simply run before thread assignment, assigning new flows to
the thread that is currently least busy. The flow tracking structure
is augmented to include the thread assignment for the flow. Flows
are identified using the IP addresses of the hosts and the TCP/UDP
port numbers, allowing different flows between the same two hosts
to be separated. Using this data requires the decoding of the IP and
TCP/UDP headers. However, this is the only part of the overall de-
code stage that is required. Consequently, only a minimal subset of
decode is peformed before the flow preprocessor, and a full decode
is performed by the consumers in parallel. The flow preprocessor
itself need not be run again since a pointer to the flow information
is passed in the queue along with the pointer to the packet data.
If all the packets from a given flow drain out of the system, this
flow may be reassigned to a different thread. Changing threads is
not harmful in this case because there are no packets from the same
flow being simultaneously processed by different threads. This re-
assignment is implemented by counting the packets in the system
for each flow, incrementing the counter when the packet passes
through flow preprocessor and decrementing it when the packet
finishes processing. When a flow’s packet count reaches zero, its
assignment is removed, and it is free to be reassigned to the least-
busy thread if the flow reappears. This additional flexibility im-
proves performance slightly by improving the flow workload bal-
ance. However, it introduces one complication: the stream4 session
data remains in the stream table of the original thread, not the new
one. However, this data will be flushed from the stream table after
a timeout elapses.
3.3 Optimistic Parallelization
The prime limitation of the flow-based parallelization is that it
offers no opportunity for speedup on data streams with only a sin-
gle network flow. As discussed in Section 3.1, data sharing between
packets in the same flow stems from two key components: stream
reassembly and flowbits. However, these subsystems have certain
favorable properties that may enable a relaxation of the require-
ment. First, packets from the same flow that are separated by a
stream reassembly flush point actually have no reassembly-related
dependences between them since they will be reassembled into sep-
arate stream buffers. Second, only 36% of the rules actually test or
set the flowbits used in flow-tracking (and more than 90% of these
only apply to NetBIOS packets); rules that do not consider the flow-
bits have no dependences caused by flow-tracking. If few packets
have content matches for these rules, there will be no dependence
most of the time.
To allow intra-flow parallelization, the producer must be able to
steer packets from the same flow to different consumers while also
maintaining flowbits dependences when needed. Spreading a single
flow across threads is only valuable when the base flow-concurrent
version has a load imbalance. Consequently, the approach studied
here starts with the flow-concurrent version and opts to reassign a
flow to a different thread if the number of packets in the current
thread’s queue belonging to the flow are over a certain threshold
(providing flow affinity to avoid problems in stream reassembly).
The flow will then be reassigned to the least-loaded thread. The
first packet after reassignment is then marked with a special flush
point indicating that all previous packets from this flow should be
reassembled and sent to inspection before attempting to process
this packet in stream reassembly. This flush insures proper stream
reassembly even when a flow is reassigned to a thread to which it
has previously been assigned, making sure that the older packets
are not reassembled with the newer ones.
Reassignment must not alter the behavior of flow tracking. How-
ever, it only needs to enforce flowbits dependences for packets that
actually match rules that use flowbits; the flowbits state is irrele-
vant for other packets. Detailed statistics show that only about 3%
of the packets match flowbits rules for the all of the traces shown
in Figure 2 except DEF1. The new parallelization stalls the actual
testing or setting of flowbits until the packet which has actually
matched the rule is the oldest packet from that flow in the system.
The system determines the oldest packet by maintaining per-flow
reorder buffers, which are simply circular arrays of bits represent-
ing the completion state of packets in that flow. The flow prepro-
cessor adds an incomplete entry to the tail of a flow’s reorder buffer
whenever it processes a packet. A packet’s entry is marked com-
plete when the verification stage completes. If the newly completed
packet is at the head of the circular array, the head pointer advances
through as many complete entries as possible. Only the packet cor-
responding to the head of the circular array is allowed to test or
set flowbits, but any packet that does not require flowbits may sim-
ply mark itself complete and then exit the system. (Unlike register
renaming in superscalar processors, intrusion detection cannot use
the reorder buffers to rename the flowbits because any given opera-
tion that sets flowbits only changes some of the bits. Consequently,
such an operation must be considered both a read and a write, mak-
ing renaming useless.)
This parallelization is optimistic because it assumes that intra-
flow dependences will not be common. It then uses that assumption
to reassign flows to different threads. If the optimistic assumption
is correct, packets from the same flow need not have any ordering
imposed on them and will thus achieve intra-flow parallelism. If
the optimistic assumption is incorrect, the system will stall until
the dependences are met.
Claim: Despite sometimes stalling for a packet to reach the head
of its flow, the above system avoids deadlock.
Proof: Each consumer queue is processed in-order. Conse-
quently, either the oldest element still under inspection for the en-
tire system is being processed by its consumer thread or that thread
is currently acting as the producer. The producer for the optimistic
version is carefully designed never to wait on a consumer thread; if
the consumer to which its current packet is destined already has a
full queue, the producer will automatically reassign that flow to an-
other consumer. Even if all other consumers have full queues, the
current producer thread must still have space in its consumer queue
since it would have already switched back to being a consumer if
its queue was full. Once the thread responsible for the oldest packet
is a consumer, it must process the oldest element since allowing it
to wait in a queue further would imply a still older element that re-
quires processing (since consumer queues are processed in-order).
Even if the oldest packet tests or sets flowbits, the algorithm spec-
ified above would never stall its processing (since it is obviously
the oldest element in its flow). Consequently, this packet will never
have to stall for any other, guaranteeing that it will achieve forward
progress and that there will be no deadlocks.
Although the optimistic parallelization would allow for concur-
rency within a single flow, its performance rests upon the idea that
most rule matches do not use flowbits. If this were not actually
true, the amount of stalling in this system could be prohibitive.
4. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY
The system studied here is based on Snort version 2.6RC1,
downloadable from www.snort.org. A few modifications were
made to snort that are independent of the parallelization strategy.
The most important of these is the use of a large in-memory buffer
from which to read the packets while processing, to minimize the
system-dependent effects of reading directly from a file or network
interface. In practice, this may be an important component of IDS
performance, but separate solutions exist to address this problem,
such as a version of libpcap that uses the mmap() system call
to map a kernel ring buffer into Snort’s address space, thus avoid-
ing the overhead of copying packets to userspace. The measured
Table 1: Packet traces used to evaluate the system
Trace Name Source Date Size (MB) Packets Alerts
LL1 Lincoln Lab 4/9/99 991 3,393,919 2,382
LL2 Lincoln Lab 4/08/99 740 3,201,382 3,693
LL3 Lincoln Lab 3/24/99 694 2,453,967 186
DEF1 DEFCON 7/14/01 687 3,960,264 128,897
DEF2 DEFCON 7/14/01 842 1,050,364 396
runtimes for the tests do not include copying the packets from the
trace file into the memory buffer, nor printing out statistics data af-
ter processing, but only cover reading the packets from the memory
buffer, processing them, and generating alerts.
Snort is designed on a plugin architecture for almost all aspects
of packet processing. Preprocessors, detection mechanisms, and
notification methods are all based on modular plugins that may be
mixed and matched according to the specifications of the user and
rule writer. The system supports the stream4, flow, and HTTP In-
spect preprocessor plugins, all the standard detection plugins (those
that are not required to be explicitly enabled in the configuration
file), and the “fast” alert method, which consists of writing a line
to a text file for each alert generated. Packet logging was disabled.
In practice, it is common for large installations to use an external
database for collecting alert and log data, which may be on another
machine. These and other methods can be supported by making
their plugins reentrant. The multi-pattern matching algorithms are
also abstracted from the rest of Snort’s architecture; the modified
Wu-Manber algorithm (the default up until version 2.6) is used in
the parallel Snort.
As of Snort version 2.4, the rules and signatures are no longer
distributed and released along with Snort itself. Instead, they are
updated more often and may be downloaded separately. This paper
uses the ruleset released on March 29, 2006. All rules are enabled
except those marked as deleted or deprecated. In addition, many
rules refer to a variable, such as “home net” or “HTTP servers” (for
example, to check for patterns on streams that are only incoming or
only bound for a user’s web servers), which may be configured to
refer to the user’s own systems or network. In this study, however,
these terms were set to “any” to catch all possible attacks. Other
configuration variables exist to define which ports run particular
services, and these were left at their defaults. The preprocessors’
configurations were also left at their defaults.
Tests were run and analyzed on a 1U rack-mounted Sun Fire
X4100 server with two 2.2 GHz dual-core Opteron processors (4
processors total). The system has 4 GB of system RAM and 1 MB
L2 cache per processor core. The system is run using Linux kernel
version 2.6.15 and the GNU C library 2.3.6 with the Native POSIX
Threads Library in the Debian AMD64 distribution. The Linux
kernel supports affinity scheduling to maintain threads on the same
processor whenever possible. Instead of the standard pthread mu-
tex locks, both parallelization methods use the pthread spin locks
provided by the GNU C library. Unlike the standard mutex locks,
these lock primitives do not suspend the calling thread when they
encounter a lock that is already held by another thread; instead, they
simply spin-wait until the lock is free. Because the system uses
only as many threads as there are processors, the threads do not
need to yield the processor, and critical sections are short enough
that the overhead of invoking the operating system to block the
thread is much higher than simply spinning until the lock is free.
On x86 platforms, the spin locks are implemented using an atomic
compare-and-swap instruction.
Table 2: Uniprocessor performance levels achieved by Snort for
traces and hardware platform described in Section 4.






The packet traces used to test the system come from the 1998-
1999 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation at MIT Lincoln Lab
and from the Defcon 9 Capture the Flag contest [10, 16]. The
Lincoln Lab traces are simulations of large military networks gen-
erated during an online evaluation of IDSes and are available for
download. Because they were generated specifically for IDS test-
ing, (including anomaly-based detection systems, which require
realistic traffic models to be useful) the traces have a good col-
lection of ordinary-looking traffic content and also contain attacks
that were known at the time. The traces used here are the largest
available in the set, and come from the 1999 test. The Defcon
traces are logs from a contest in which hackers attempt to attack
and defend vulnerable systems. Consequently, these traces contain
a huge amount of attacks and anomalous traffic, representing a sort
of pathological case for intrusion detection systems. For example,
DEF1 generates a very large number of alerts (even compared to
the LL traces, which are seeded with real attacks). Table 1 shows
a summary of the traces used, their source, their capture date, the
number and total size of the packets they contain, and the resulting
number of alerts.
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This section gives experimental results for the parallelization
strategies, using the hardware platform and traces described in Sec-
tion 4. Table 2 gives the throughput achieved by the standard
uniprocessor Snort for each of the traces; the results for paral-
lel speedup are relative to these performance levels. The average
throughput of the uniprocessor Snort is 557 Mbps.
5.1 Flow-concurrent Parallelization
Figure 5 shows the parallel speedup achieved by the conserva-
tive scheme on the Opteron-based Sun Fire system. Each group of
bars represents one of the packet traces, while the bars themselves
show the performance running with 2, 3, and 4 threads. The bars
show that the flow concurrent scheme achieves good speedup on
the three LL traces but not on the DEFCON traces. The conserva-


















2 Threads 3 Threads 4 Threads
Figure 5: Parallel speedup for conservative parallelism on Sun
Fire X4100 server with two dual-core Opteron processors (4
processors total)
The three LL traces have similar speedup characteristics, achiev-
ing 73–83% of the theoretical ideal linear speedup for 2–4 threads
and achieving 2.9–3.0 speedup at 4 threads. All 3 traces see pro-
cessing rates in excess of 1 Gbps with 4 threads; LL1 and LL3
achieve this rate with 3. The peak processing rate is 1.7 Gbps. The
two factors that limit performance in these cases are a small amount
of imbalance (occasionally more than one thread ran out of work
at the same time) and synchronization and data transfer overheads
(primarily in the form of cache-to-cache transfers between proces-
sors).
In contrast, the DEFCON traces, and in particular DEF2,
achieves little speedup in any case. As discussed previously, the
DEF1 and DEF2 workloads behave very differently from the oth-
ers. As it turns out, DEF2 has extremely poor flow concurrency;
in fact, for much of the trace there is only one active flow, so
no flow-based parallelization scheme can hope for any significant
improvement. DEF1 has several factors which contribute to poor
performance. First, it triggers an extreme number of alerts, and
because alerts require synchronization, significantly more time is
spent waiting for locks with DEF1. Second, DEF1 apparently con-
tains attack attempts which create and abandon huge numbers of
flows. This is the cause of the large preprocessing time seen in
figure 2; in fact, for the single-threaded case, over 17% of the to-
tal time is spent in the flow preprocessor searching and updating
the hash table containing the flows. This limits the speed of the
producer routine, and thus the whole system. Lastly, despite the
load on the flow preprocessor, DEF1 also has relatively poor flow
concurrency, because the created flows are quickly abandoned and
most of the actual traffic is concentrated in a relatively small num-
ber of flows. These last two problems exacerbate each other, be-
cause threads acting as consumers are more likely to run out of
data when the producer is slower. These effects also combine to
greatly increase the lock and cache-transfer overhead because mul-
tiple threads with empty queues may compete for the lock which
protects the producer routine, and the data used by the producer
routine is transferred frequently. Of course, the source and nature
of the DEFCON workload mean that diminished performance is to
be expected; it reflects a very small network and an extremely ad-
versarial environment where nearly all traffic is malicious. A sys-
tem that detects such a high rate of alerts may respond quickly by
more aggressive firewalling to shut off traffic on vulnerable ports
















2 Threads 3 Threads 4 Threads
Figure 6: Parallel speedup for optimistic parallelism on Sun
Fire X4100 server with two dual-core Opteron processors (4
processors total)
The other traces are actually more likely to be dangerous since they
have a small number of attacks hidden in a larger amount of “nor-
mal” traffic. Consequently, such workloads require extreme vigi-
lance to prevent compromise, and the conservative parallelization
performs quite well on 3 of those 4 workloads.
5.2 Optimistic flow reassignment
DEF2, as mentioned, has poor flow concurrency, and is thus a
good candidate for improvement using the optimistic flow reassign-
ment method. Figure 6 shows the performance using the optimistic
reassignment method, with a reassignment threshold of 100 (about
10% of the queue length). DEF2 indeed shows benefits over the
conservative method, improving performance by about 50% for 4
threads to achieve a factor of 2.2 parallel speedup and a peak traf-
fic rate over 2 Gbps. The value chosen for the threshold should be
small enough so that when a packet matches a flowbit rule and must
wait for previous packets, it does not have to wait too long (since
the number of packets ahead of it can be no more than the thresh-
old multiplied by the number of other queues). However it must be
large enough to avoid excessive switching (which causes too much
flushing and other overhead in stream reassembly). In practice, 100
is a good balance.
Since the LL traces already have good flow concurrency, opti-
mistic flow reassignment provides no benefit; in fact, their perfor-
mance is degraded by 7–13% compared to the pure flow-concurrent
method because of the overhead of maintaining the reorder buffers.
In particular, updating and checking the bits in the buffer and the
head and tail pointers must be done even when packets in a flow are
serialized, and this must be done while holding the mutex lock as-
sociated with the flow, leading to additional synchronization over-
head when compared to the conservative model. DEF1 also does
not benefit from reassignment because it matches so many rules,
and most of the packets actually trigger setting or checking of flow-
bits. Thus, any advantage gained by reassigning flows is erased
because so many flows must serialize themselves. Further, since
the serialized flows are spread across all the threads, they even
block flows behind them that might otherwise have been able to
pass them. Consequently, the overall rate in DEF1 is reduced to
slightly less than that of the single-threaded case.
Despite the degradations in processing some of the traces, the
average traffic rate of the optimistic parallelization is roughly the
same as the conservative at 1.09 Gbps. The peak rate is actually
much higher, at over 2 Gbps. The optimistic parallelization sees
good parallel speedup for 4 out of 5 traces, though these are some-
what lower than the conservative version for 3 traces.
5.3 Discussion
The results in this section indicate substantial benefits from par-
allelization in the Snort network intrusion detection system. For
most realistic scenarios with many simultaneous packet flows, con-
servative flow-based parallelism is sufficient. Networks with poor
flow concurrency can see benefits from optimistic reassignment of
flows, provided that the number of packets that must check flow-
bits is limited. This parallelization is achieved while using hard-
ware that is increasingly becoming commoditized, allowing for fast
single-node edge-based network intrusion detection. As architec-
tures continue to evolve, all expectations are for more multicore
and multiprocessor solutions and less potential benefit from ramp-
ing up clock frequency. Thus it is essential for an application as
important as network intrusion detection to achieve its performance
by exploiting fine-grained flow-level and intra-flow parallelism.
The flow reassignment scheme considered here is quite simple,
and variations on it may improve its responsiveness or limit its over-
head. For example, 90% of the flowbits rules are related to Net-
BIOS, so it may be reasonable to prevent a flow on a NetBIOS port
from being reassigned since such a reassigned flow will likely have
to stall in setting or checking flowbits. Indeed, preliminary exper-
iments with DEF1 indicate that preventing reassignment on Net-
BIOS ports mitigates some of the negative effects of reassignment
and allows the optimistic parallelization to have some speedup rel-
ative to the single-threaded case. More detailed experiments would
be needed to study the impact of such changes on the other traces
and determine if such strategies could be effectively automated by
analyzing the ruleset. As another example, the effectiveness of re-
assignment may vary substantially with the conditions used for re-
assignment. Experiments with reducing or increasing the flow re-
assignment threshold suggest that thresholds below 100 suffer from
the overhead of additional flushes in stream reassembly while larger
thresholds cause excessive stall times when flowbits rules actually
match. Additional modifications were tested that would prevent re-
assignment if the queue length at the reassignment target were at
least a certain percentage of the queue length of the origin (indicat-
ing some load balance factor). However, this condition had little
impact on performance even as this threshold was varied from as
high as 50% all the way down to 10%.
The optimistic system is also still conservative in how it manages
rules that actually use flowbits since it stalls when a flowbit is to
be set or checked out-of-order. The impact of flowbit stalls can
be mitigated by exploiting the fact that verification of rule options
occurs in the order they are specified; if any of the tests fail or do not
match, the remaining tests are skipped. Flowbits are often specified
early among the options because on a single-threaded machine they
are very fast. However for the optimistic scheme they can be moved
to the end of the rule and not checked unless all other conditions
match. Such ruleset modifications seem more practical than using
a purely optimistic solution that speculatively performs the flowbit
operation and then rolls back if there was a violation, since such
rollbacks would require the reprocessing of many packets and a
great deal of stored state.
6. RELATED WORK
Clustered intrusion-detection systems are among the most popu-
larly deployed approaches to high-performance intrusion detection
because they exploit multiple low-cost, identically-configured and
administered PCs along with a load-balancing switch. Schaelicke
et al. have proposed SPANIDS, a system that combines a specially-
designed FPGA-based load-balancing switch that considers flow
information and system load when redirecting packets to com-
modity PCs that run intrusion detection software [15]. Commer-
cial offerings by F5 and Radware use the companies’ L4–7 load-
balancing switches to redirect traffic to a pool of intrusion-detection
nodes, allowing high overall throughput scalability [8, 13]. By
exploiting current architectural trends toward low-cost multicore
and multiprocessor PCs, the parallelized Snort achieves good per-
formance for small to mid-scale deployments without the expense
of a load-balancing switch. For larger deployments, the parallel
Snort versions presented here could be used in a clustered IDS with
greater per-system performance and higher space-efficiency.
The research community has also proposed distributed NIDS, in
which nodes at various points in the network track anomalies and
collaboratively collect data that may indicate a system-level intru-
sion even if no specific host triggers an alert [17, 9]. For example,
Snapp et al. point out that an individual host experiencing a few
failed logins may be normal, but a pattern of failed logins across a
domain may indicate an intrusion attempt [17]. Collaborative infor-
mation sharing may thus improve the overall rate of detecting in-
trusions. However, efforts in distributed NIDS have invariably tar-
geted gathering additional information to identify intrusions, rather
than processing packets at a faster rate. Thus, distributed NIDS is
largely orthogonal of the parallel processing approach.
Because matching multiple simultaneous strings is such an im-
portant component of intrusion detection and because it can poten-
tially exploit extensive hardware concurrency, several works have
proposed hardware support for this stage. Several works use recon-
figurable FPGAs since the hardware can simply be resynthesized
on ruleset updates. Moscola et al. match not only exact strings but
also regular expressions, exploiting packet-level parallelism across
independent scanning engines [11]. Sourdis and Pnevmatikatos
have used independent comparison pipelines in an FPGA to per-
form exact string matching at a rate of multiple characters per clock
cycle [18]. Baker and Prasanna have given an FPGA-based syn-
thesis algorithm that optimizes the set of characters to those that
actually exist in matching patterns and then uses several indepen-
dent matching pipelines for individual bits of those characters [3].
Instead of depending on the reconfigurability of FPGAs for rule-
set updates, several works use SRAM for storage of string tables.
Aldwairi et al. presented a network processor architecture with
string-matching accelerators based on simple FSMs [2]. Tan and
Sherwood use a compact SRAM-based representation of the string
table along with a special-purpose hardware engine that processes
the data by exploiting parallelism on a bit-level granularity [19].
Brodie et al. developed a pipelined FSM representation that allows
high-speed matching of regular expressions [6], and can be imple-
mented in an FPGA or an ASIC.
Though there has been much work that can effectively accelerate
the multi-string and regular expression matching tasks, it is not suf-
ficient. Figure 2 shows an average of 35% of processing time for
multi-string and 15% for regular expression matching, for a com-
bined total of almost 51% for the LL traces. According to Ahm-
dal’s Law, even if it were made infinitely fast, only a 54% over-
all speedup could be obtained with accelerated string-matching,
or 96% if regular expressions were accelerated as well. Clearly,
though these components are the most important, they cannot be
treated in isolation from the rest of the system, and an IDS is not
complete if it has only these components. The software approach to
parallelizing the various stages of intrusion detection should work
synergistically with hardware that speeds up string matching and
regular expression matching, increasing its effectiveness.
There has also been some investigation on running intrusion de-
tection software on network processors: Bos and Huang implement
a rudimentary IDS which uses the Intel IXP network processor ar-
chitecture and its parallel microengine processor cores to perform
Aho-Corasick string matching, stream reconstruction, and I/O op-
erations [4]. Vermeiren et al. propose several strategies for a mul-
tithreaded Snort with the aim of running it on high-end network
microprocessors [20] such as the Broadcom BCM1250 [5]. That
work does not discuss any solutions for maintaining dependences
across the stages of Snort processing or for insuring that packets
from the same flow are processed in an appropriate order.
Other intrusion detection software systems also exist, such as
the Bro IDS from Lawrence Berkeley National Labs [12]. Bro
rules can detect all standard Snort traffic signatures as well as
anomalies such as an excessive number of connections. This paper
chooses a Snort-based system primarily because of its popularity
and greater update frequency. Despite the differences among sys-
tems, the problem of and need for fine-grained parallelism applies
to all NIDS software, and the fundamental challenges and solutions
discussed here apply to any system that employs stream reassembly
and flow tracking to provide stateful ruleset processing.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents and evaluates conservative and optimistic
parallelization strategies for network intrusion detection. Although
this paper specifically targets Snort, the challenges and solutions
described here apply to any NIDS that performs stream reassembly
and flow-tracking. Both parallelization schemes have their limita-
tions, but both perform quite well for most of the workloads that
they target. The conservative parallelization achieves substantial
speedups on 3 of the 5 network packet traces studied, ranging as
high as 3.0 speedup on 4 processor cores and processing at speeds
up to 1.7 Gbps. The extra overheads in the optimistic paralleliza-
tion degrade performance by about 10% for the traces that exhibit
flow concurrency, limiting speedup to 2.8 on four cores. However,
the potential for intra-flow parallelism enabled by the optimistic
approach allows one additional trace to see good speedup (2.2 on
four cores), with a peak traffic rate over 2 Gbps. Both schemes see
an average traffic rate of just over 1 Gbps for the 5 traces, nearly
doubling the performance of the serial version with only a slight
increase in hardware cost and no increase in space. These results
can be achieved while using hardware that is cost-effective, space-
efficient, and increasingly being commoditized.
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